A weakness has been found in the WPA/WPA2 protocol that is frequently used to secure Wi-Fi networks. An attacker within range of the victim can exploit this weakness using the key reinstallation attack (KRACK) exploit. The vulnerability is within the WPA/WPA2 protocol and is not implementation specific.
Medium
PLYTV17-06
10/16/2017
3/14/2022
Poly
Poly continues to investigate all products that support Wi-Fi functionality to determine if any are vulnerable. KRACK leverages weaknesses in the WPA/WPA2 wireless protocol, so products that don’t support wireless, including all infrastructure products, will not be vulnerable.
CVE 2017-13077
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) Temporal Key (TK) during the four-way handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames.
CVE 2017-13078
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Group Temporal Key (GTK) during the four-way handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay frames from access points to clients.
CVE 2017-13079
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that supports IEEE 802.11w allows reinstallation of the Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK) during the four-way handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to spoof frames from access points to clients.
CVE 2017-13080
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Group Temporal Key (GTK) during the group key handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay frames from access points to clients.
CVE 2017-13081
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that supports IEEE 802.11w allows reinstallation of the Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK) during the group key handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to spoof frames from access points to clients.
CVE 2017-13082
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that supports IEEE 802.11r allows reinstallation of the Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) Temporal Key (TK) during the fast BSS transmission (FT) handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames.
CVE 2017-13083
Akeo Consulting Rufus prior to version 2.17.1187 does not adequately validate the integrity of updates downloaded over HTTP, allowing an attacker to easily convince a user to execute arbitrary code.
CVE 2017-13084
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Station-To-Station-Link (STSL) Transient Key (STK) during the PeerKey handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames.
CVE 2017-13086
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Tunneled Direct-Link Setup (TDLS) Peer Key (TPK) during the TDLS handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames.
CVE 2017-13087
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that support 802.11v allows reinstallation of the Group Temporal Key (GTK) when processing a Wireless Network Management (WNM) Sleep Mode Response frame, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay frames from access points to clients.
CVE 2017-13088
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that support 802.11v allows reinstallation of the Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK) when processing a Wireless Network Management (WNM) Sleep Mode Response frame, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay frames from access points to clients.
CVE ID |
CVS 3.0 |
Severity |
Vector |
---|---|---|---|
CVE-2017-13077 |
6.8 |
Medium |
CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N |
CVE-2017-13078 |
5.3 |
Medium |
CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N |
CVE-2017-13079 |
5.3 |
Medium |
CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N |
CVE ID: CVE-2017-13080 |
5.3 |
Medium |
CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N |
CVE ID: CVE-2017-13081 |
5.3 |
Medium |
CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N |
CVE-2017-13082 |
8.1 |
High |
CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N |
CCVE ID: CVE-2017-13083 |
8.1 |
High |
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
CVE-2017-13084 |
6.8 |
Medium |
CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N |
CVE-2017-13086 |
6.8 |
Medium |
CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N |
CVE-2017-13087 |
5.3 |
Medium |
CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N |
CVE-2017-13088 |
5.3 |
Medium |
CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N |
Learn more about CVSS 3.0 base metrics, which range from 0 to 10.
Poly recommends customers upgrade to the respective firmware as applicable.
Poly is continuing to investigate our products for impact. Until further determinations can be made, security-conscious customers can mitigate the potential for exploit by turning off Wi-Fi and Miracast on Poly devices under investigation.
The Poly Trio 8800 can be configured for wireless communication using WPA/WPA2, leaving it potentially vulnerable in this mode to KRACK. Security conscious customers can disable wireless on the unit and use it in a cabled configuration to mitigate this vulnerability until a patch is released.
Identify the affected products for this issue.
Product |
Status |
---|---|
Group Series |
Not Vulnerable |
Centro |
Not Vulnerable |
Medialign |
Not Vulnerable |
RMX / Collaboration Server |
Not Vulnerable |
DMA |
Not Vulnerable |
RealPresence Access Director |
Not Vulnerable |
RealPresence Websuite |
Not Vulnerable |
VVX |
Not Vulnerable |
Trio |
Potentially Vulnerable with Wi-Fi on |
Debut |
Not Vulnerable |
RealPresence MediaSuite |
Not Vulnerable |
SoundPoint IP |
Not Vulnerable |
SoundStation IP |
Not Vulnerable |
SoundStructure |
Not Vulnerable |
HDX |
Not Vulnerable |
RealPresence Resource Manager |
Not Vulnerable |
Pano |
Fixed in 1.1 |
This document has been revised according to the following information.
Version |
Description |
Date |
---|---|---|
2.0 |
Format Changes |
3/14/2022 |
1.2 |
Updates to product status (Pano) and language changes |
12/19/2017 |
1.1 |
Updates to product status and language changes |
10/17/2017 |
1.0 |
Initial Release |
10/16/2017 |
Follow these links for additional information.
Third-party security patches that are to be installed on systems running Poly software products should be applied in accordance with the customer's patch management policy.
Any customer using an affected system who is concerned about this vulnerability within their deployment should contact Poly Technical Support – (888) 248-4143, (916) 928-7561, or visit the Poly Support Site.
To view released Security Bulletins, visit https://support.hp.com/security-bulletins.
It is strongly recommended that security related information being communicated to HP be encrypted using PGP, especially exploit information.
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